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FEATURE COMMENT: Suing The
Government As A ‘Joint Employer’—
Evolving Pathologies Of The Blended
Workforce
The contemporary Federal Government’s nature, as
a hollowed-out, insatiable consumer of services, is
increasingly well documented. Many of the public
policy and economic risks associated with this phenomenon have been acknowledged, but not all of the
pathologies an outsourced Government breeds are
fully understood.
As the “blended workforce”—a realm in which
contractors work alongside, and often are indistinguishable from, their Government counterparts—
becomes more commonplace, the distinction between
civil servants, members of the military and contractor
employees increasingly blurs. Indeed, as agencies
routinely rely on service contracts—or, more specifically, employee augmentation agreements—to
supplement their depleted Government staffs, the
long-standing statutory/regulatory prohibition
against personal service contracts is increasingly
perceived as a dead letter.
Alas, the Government’s experience and sophistication in managing and supervising the blended
workforce lags its growth. One intriguing (and,
apparently, accelerating), yet little-known trend is
that contractor employees are more frequently suing the Government, alleging employment discrimination on the part of Government managers, supervisors or even coworkers. That seems like quite a
wrench to throw into the contractual relationship.
How Did We Get To This Point?—If the idea
of contractor employees suing Government supervisors sounds unnatural to you, you are not alone.
4-080-547-2		

Indeed, to many familiar with the traditional relationship between a Government customer and its
contractor, it is surprising that these suits even exist.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits—and provides remedies for individuals subjected to—employment discrimination. See 42 USCA
§§ 2000e to e-17 (2006). Title VII’s reach is broad,
making it illegal for employers to discriminate on
the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
age, disability, or genetic information,” or to retaliate
against an individual for filing a charge of discrimination, participating in an investigation, or opposing
discriminatory practices. 29 CFR § 1614.101 (2010).
Discrimination is defined as denying any of these
suspect groups “the same employment, promotion,
membership, or other employment opportunities as
have been available to other employees or applicants.”
29 CFR § 1607.11 (2010). For the purposes of Title
VII, disparate treatment can occur in any aspect of
employment, including, among other things: hiring
and firing, assignment or transfer of employees, or
other terms and conditions of employment. Indeed,
the last category proves the most flexible in practice.
Of course, no one sues the Federal Government
without its permission. Sovereign immunity is a well
established principle in this country. Accordingly,
when Congress amended Title VII, in 1972, to protect
federal employees, see 42 USCA § 2000e-16 (2006), it
extended the Federal Government’s liability to only
“those individuals in a direct employment relationship
with a government employer.” Spirides v. Reinhardt,
613 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1979). At the time, Congress never contemplated that contractor personnel
might exploit these protections against Government
supervisors. Indeed, the civil service laws specifically
require that all federal employees be “appointed in
the civil service.” 5 USCA § 2105(a) (2006). And it is
pretty clear that contractor personnel, by definition,
are not appointed to the civil service.
More than 30 years ago, however, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit expanded Title VII’s waiver of sovereign immunity
and enabled certain contractor personnel, in unique
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circumstances, to sue the Government for employment
discrimination. In Spirides, a female foreign language
broadcaster, working as an independent contractor
for the U.S. International Communication Agency
(USICA), sued it for sex discrimination. The court held
that it was improper to apply the narrow 5 USCA §
2105(a) definition of “federal employee” to Title VII
cases, because § 2105(a) applies only to the civil service
laws. In a moment of prescience, the court clarified that
Title VII should be liberally construed because it is
remedial in character. Specifically, the court explained
that “[u]se of the restrictive civil service definition ...
would not effectuate the broad remedial purposes of
the Act, and would therefore be inappropriate.” Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831.
Instead, the court defined employee by applying “general principles of the law of agency to [the]
undisputed or established facts” of the case. Id. This
approach requires an examination of all aspects of the
relationship between the individual and the alleged
employer to determine if an employment relationship exists. While no single factor is determinative,
the most important element is the extent to which
the employer has the right to control the means and
manner of the individual’s work performance. “If
an employer has the right to control and direct the
work of an individual, not only as to the result to be
achieved, but also as to the details by which that result is achieved, an employer/employee relationship
is likely to exist.” Id. at 831–32.
Explosion of Service Contracts—At the time,
this had little effect on the relationship between the
Federal Government and its contractors. The situation in Spirides was unique; USICA had authority under 22 USCA § 1471(5) (1970) to hire foreign language
broadcasters “without regard to the civil service and
classification laws.” Most federal agencies had not
yet employed large cadres of contractor personnel to
augment, and often work alongside, civil servants.
The prohibition on personal service contracting was
still respected, and federal agencies were cognizant of
the need to avoid situations that created employmenttype relationships with contractors.
By the 1990s, however, in the name of “new public
management,” the Clinton administration aggressively turned to the private sector as it trumpeted a massive Government downsizing initiative. Clinton-era
budgets suggested that they represented the smallest
Government since the Kennedy administration. Federal employee rolls (and, particularly, members of the
2

acquisition workforce) were reduced out of a political
desire to “end the era of big Government.” According
to Paul Light, over 418,000 federal civil servant jobs
were cut as part of this effort between 1990 and 2002.
Light, Fact Sheet on the New True Size of Government 5 (2003), available at www.brookings.edu/~/
media/Files/rc/articles/2003/0905politics_light/
light20030905.pdf; see also Light, “Outsourcing and
the True Size of Government,” 33 Pub. Cont. L.J. 311
(2004). The second Bush administration continued
this bipartisan trend. Now, two decades later, federal
agencies find themselves, in reality, left with little
more than a skeletal workforce that lacks the inhouse personnel resources to sufficiently achieve their
mandates and perform the Government’s broad range
of duties and responsibilities.
To cope with this situation, the Federal Government had no choice but to outsource functions to
contractors. Agencies dramatically increased their use
of service, and particularly employee-augmentation,
contracts. One estimate suggests that more than
one-third of a million service contractor jobs were
created between 1990 and 2002. Overall, from 1999
to 2002, as many as 727,000 contractor jobs were created to support the Federal Government. Light, Fact
Sheet, supra, at 5. More than half a million of these
jobs were created in the Department of Defense, the
Department of Energy and NASA. Id. at 6. Services
absorbed increasingly large portions of the federal
procurement budget; by 2005, over 60 percent of
federal procurement dollars were spent on service
contracts. See 49 GC ¶ 2.
In light of the last decade’s military actions, the
trend worked its way into the public’s consciousness.
For the last few years, more contractors have served in
Iraq and Afghanistan than members of the military. Indeed, these contractors not only perform more militaryrelated tasks and support functions, but they also face
the risks associated with performing those functions.
This has led to a stark increase in the number of contractor fatalities on the battlefield, particularly since
2007. Overall, more than 2,000 contractor personnel
have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most disturbingly, in the first half of this year, more contractor
personnel than U.S. military service members died in
these countries. See Schooner & Swan, “Contractors
and the Ultimate Sacrifice,” Service Contractor 16
(September 2010).
This massive outsourcing also exacerbated a
deepening contract-management crisis. It is now
The Government Contractor © 2010 Thomson Reuters
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well understood that the demands on the purchasing community have increased dramatically since
2001. As a result, we more frequently witness a
triage-type focus on buying which severely limits
the resources available for contract administration.
See 47 GC ¶ 203. This is caused in part by “the additional demands that service contracting places on
the acquisition workforce.” Report of the Acquisition
Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy and the United States Congress 356 (2007),
available at www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/final
aapreport.html. Service contracts often require greater
involvement and attention from acquisition personnel
during the contract formation process, as well as in
contract management and oversight, “in order to enable the government to ensure that it is receiving the
services for which it has contracted.” Id.
More significantly, for the purposes of this discussion, the increased reliance on employee-augmentation
contracts has blurred the distinction between contractor employees and civil servants in the Government
workspace. Despite the Federal Acquisition Regulation’s long-standing prohibition on personal service
contracts, see FAR 37.104, agencies have increasingly
relied on these types of contractual relationships to
fulfill their missions. Specific statutory and regulatory
authorizations allowing agencies to hire temporary
workers, consultants and experts have become voluminous. And, in the absence of appropriate waivers
of the personal services prohibition, the bar is simply
ignored. Today, it is not unusual in most agencies to
find contractor personnel and civil servants working
in the same offices and, all too often, performing the
same or similar functions.
The Evolving Joint Employer Liability
Doctrine—As hordes of contractor employees began
working alongside civil servants, federal courts and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) faced a rising number of employment discrimination complaints brought by these contractor
employees against their federal supervisors. In their
attempt to adjudicate these complaints, the federal
courts and the EEOC returned to the Spirides analysis.
As the Spirides doctrine evolved, the EEOC and
federal courts began employing slightly different nomenclature to describe their analyses. For example,
the EEOC prefers the term “common law agency test”;
whereas some federal courts prefer the terms “Spirides test” or the “joint employment test.” All of these
The Government Contractor © 2010 Thomson Reuters
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tests, however, apply the same common law agency
principles that take into account the entirety of the
relationship between the individual and the federal
agency, with the most important factor being whether
the potential employer has the right to control the
individual’s work performance. The different tests, in
practice, generally produce similar results.
The Federal Courts: Spirides Applied to
Joint Employer Liability—In 1995, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
broadened the application of Spirides to situations
in which an aggrieved individual sues the Federal
Government despite being a primary employee of an
independent contractor, such as a staffing agency or
temporary hiring firm. In King v. Dalton, 895 F. Supp.
831, 834–35 (E.D. Va. 1995), Stephanie King was
employed by a contractor providing support services
for the installation of naval satellite communication
systems. When King became subject to the unwanted
advances of, and derogatory comments by, the naval
supervisor in charge of planning and executing the
project, she brought a sexual harassment suit against
the Navy. Although the court found that King was not
a joint employee of the contractor and the Navy, the
court stated that the contractor’s “undisputed status
as King’s employer does not automatically preclude a
finding that the Navy shared that status during the
time period in question.” King, 895 F. Supp. at 837.
In essence, King starkly established the proposition that the Federal Government could no longer
shield itself from liability simply by asserting it does
not directly employ or pay contractor personnel. The
concept of “joint employer liability” was previously
applied in Title VII cases in the private employment
context. See, e.g., Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., 30
F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that owner of
ocean-side hotel employing a management contractor
was a joint employer of the contractor’s employee).
King, however, was the first case to apply this concept
to the Federal Government.
Since King, the D.C. Circuit has accepted the idea
that the Federal Government can be considered a “joint
employer” for Title VII purposes. In Redd v. Summers,
232 F.3d 933, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2000), Trayon Redd, a
tour guide assigned by a personnel corporation to the
Bureau of Engraving and Printing, sued the Bureau
for discriminatory termination. The court applied the
Spirides test to determine whether the Bureau could
be considered Redd’s “joint employer,” although the
court opined that it would have preferred to use the
3
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nomenclature of the Third Circuit’s “joint employment
test.” See Redd, 232 F.3d at 938 (The Third Circuit’s
test asks whether “one employer[,] while contracting
in good faith with an otherwise independent company,
has retained for itself sufficient control of the terms
and conditions of employment of the employees” of the
contractor. (quoting NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of
Pa., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982))). While Redd
ultimately failed to obtain the relief she sought, the
D.C. Circuit’s opinion further solidified the idea that a
federal agency, in certain situations, may be considered
a “joint employer” of a contractor employee.
The EEOC and Common Law Agency—Leaping the chasm from precedent to policy less than
two years after King, the EEOC issued enforcement
guidance specifically stating that “a federal agency
qualifies as a joint employer of an individual assigned
to it if it has the requisite control over that worker.”
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, No. 915-002,
Enforcement Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to
Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employment Agencies and Other Staffing Firms 7 (1997),
available at www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/conting.html.
Soon after, in 1998, the EEOC appeared to break
new ground in Ma v. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., EEOC Decision No. 01962390 (1998). Ma and
her husband conducted biomedical research while
serving as visiting fellows at the National Institutes
of Health. Ma claimed that when she informed her
research supervisor that she was pregnant, he encouraged the couple to abort the pregnancy, began to
closely monitor her activities and pressured her not
to request heightened protection from radiation. Ma
recognized that Title VII specifically prohibits sexbased discrimination, which includes discrimination
based on pregnancy and childbirth. Accordingly, Ma
sued her federal “employer.”
The EEOC decided to apply the “common law
agency test” to determine if Ma was an NIH employee,
recognizing that “the factors listed for consideration
in the Spirides decision are drawn from the common
law of agency test.” Ma, EEOC Decision No. 01962390
at 8. The EEOC relied on the common law agency
test for two reasons: (1) Title VII does not specifically
define “federal employee” beyond the general definition of “an individual employed by an employer,” id.
at 7 (quoting 42 USCA § 2000e(f) (1994)); and (2) the
U.S. Supreme Court previously stated that “[w]here
Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled
meaning under ... the common law, a court must infer,
4
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unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress
means to incorporate the established meaning of
these terms,” id. (quoting Cmty. for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)). The EEOC
ultimately determined that Ma and her husband were
not NIH employees for Title VII purposes. Ma may
have lost her case, but her struggles now represent
landmark precedent. More than 338 additional EEOC
decisions have now referenced Ma.
One More Nail in the Personal Services Coffin—The federal courts’ and the EEOC’s willingness
to define federal agencies as de facto employers of
contractor employees is further evidence that the prohibition on personal service contracts is—or should
now be deemed—a dead letter. For example, the AAP in
2007 recommended an easing of the personal services
prohibition “to promote efficient management of the
blended federal workforce.” See 48 GC ¶ 282. The AAP
report began with the premise that this prohibition
“doesn’t take proper recognition of where we are as a
workforce today.” Acquisition Advisory Panel, supra,
at 400. The proliferation of statutory exceptions to
the prohibition, combined with the fact that “agencies
often ignore the prohibition” anyway, see 48 GC ¶ 282,
indicates that the prohibition is a legal abstraction
with little remaining relevance to practical reality. See
also Schooner & Greenspahn, “Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards For Responsible Governance,” J. Cont. Mgmt. 16 (Summer 2008). Ultimately,
it is hard to manage a problem when you deny it exists.
Accordingly, it is time for either the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy or Congress (or both) to revisit the
utility of perpetuating the now anachronistic personal
services prohibition.
More Government Challenges in Managing
the Blended Workforce—Our sense is that most
Government managers and contracting professionals
have not fully recognized their potential liability as
a joint employer of contractor personnel. Indeed, it
seems that even knowledgeable professionals are unaware that this potential liability exists. For example,
application of joint employer liability to federal agencies seems directly contrary to the AAP’s conclusion
that “the activities that are currently barred as [personal service contracts] by the FAR would not create
... an employer-employee relationship.” Acquisition
Advisory Panel, supra, at 404.
The courts’ and EEOC’s application of joint employer liability further demonstrates how important
it is for federal agencies to train not only managers
The Government Contractor © 2010 Thomson Reuters
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but all Government personnel—whether political
appointees, senior executive service, civil servants,
military officers and even enlisted personnel—in
how to appropriately supervise and interact with
contractors. It is unrealistic to assume that, at any
time in the near future, federal agencies will be able
to significantly reduce their reliance on contractor
employees and temporary hires. Frankly, the Government “currently has no short-term option but to
rely on contractors for every conceivable task that
it lacks appropriate staff to fulfill.” Schooner and
Greenspahn, supra, at 10. As a result, Government
personnel need to be aware of the growing liabilities
associated with both managing and operating within
a blended workforce. A broad range of remedies are
available for employment discrimination, including,
among others, back pay, reinstatement, other actions
that will make an individual “whole,” attorneys’ fees,
expert witness fees and court costs.
But this is not merely a fiscal issue. From both
an organizational and a human resources viewpoint,
employment discrimination suits have the potential
to disrupt and destabilize the workplace.
Still, it is easy to see the potential risk to
Government agencies. One of the most compelling arguments that frustrated Government managers offer
in support of outsourcing has been that it is easier for
them to jettison individual contractor employees, for
whatever reason, than to terminate or reassign civil
servants. These federal managers fail to realize, however, that a contractor employee’s denial of a preferred
assignment or an employment opportunity could spur
a discrimination claim against their agency. Moreover,
Government managers must recognize that there are
limits, particularly in offices and organizations in
which either civil servants or contractors have alleged
discrimination. Specifically, Title VII makes it illegal
to retaliate against an individual for filing a charge
of discrimination, opposing discriminatory practices,
or “participating in any stage of administrative or
judicial proceedings.” 29 CFR § 1614.101(b) (2010).
Behavioral norms vary widely among the
military, the civil service and contractor organizations. Indeed, they also vary within each of these
categories—among the military services, among
various agencies and departments, and throughout
the private sector. Most Government supervisors
know better than to ask a subordinate out on a date,
but they may not appreciate the risks associated
with similarly approaching a contractor employee.
The Government Contractor © 2010 Thomson Reuters
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Government managers must understand that sexual
harassment includes not only “[u]nwelcome sexual
advances [and] requests for sexual favors” but also
“other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
... [that] ... has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual’s work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (2010). These
types of relationships can prove problematic, even
among individuals that appear to be peers. The EEOC
makes clear that
[s]exual harassment can occur in a variety of
circumstances …. The victim does not have to be
of the opposite sex. The harasser can be the victim’s supervisor, … a supervisor in another area,
a co-worker, or a non-employee. The victim does
not have to be the person harassed but could be
anyone affected by the offensive conduct.

Facts About Sexual Harassment, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (June 27, 2002), www.eeoc.gov/
facts/fs-sex.html (emphasis added). The potential
for a hostile work environment claim does not seem
far-fetched.
Looking ahead, particularly as the administration struggles with the military’s “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” policy, discrimination claims brought by
contractor employees based on sexual orientation
could raise some serious concerns, particularly if
contractors are supporting the military. As a general
rule, the EEOC does not protect against discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation.
See Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation,
Status as a Parent, Marital Status and Political Affiliation, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, www.
eeoc.gov/federal/otherprotections.cfm (last visited
Oct. 15, 2010). However, EO 13087 amended EO
11478 to include sexual orientation as a prohibited
basis for discrimination. See EO 13087, 63 Fed. Reg.
30097 (May 28, 1998). Although sexual orientation
as a basis for discrimination is currently still not
actionable under Title VII, the current environment
suggests that this could change in the future. This
would raise some additional risks, particularly for
military supervisors.
Federal managers also need to recognize the disruptive effects these suits can cause. Training and
other preventive measures are critical. But who is
providing federal supervisors with the appropriate
training? To implement appropriate measures, supervisors need to be aware of this phenomenon and
5
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understand how it affects their workplace. Above all,
federal managers need to appreciate that they can no
longer hide behind a formalistic employee-contractor
distinction. As this precedent develops, both in concreteness and in volume, it becomes increasingly difficult (nay, impossible) for Congress to put the genie
back in the bottle.
Contractors Beware: Unanticipated Risk to
Maintaining Customer Satisfaction—The Government’s status as a joint employer also has implications on the other side of the table. Contractors need
to appreciate how this phenomenon will affect their
relationship with their Government customer. Unless
proper mechanisms are in place to adequately address
employment issues before they arise, the resulting
discrimination suits by employees could have devastating effects on the company’s future as a Government contractor. Consider, for example, that the EEO
regime is perceived as being particularly susceptible
to frivolous suits, often brought by disgruntled (or dismissed) employees. Moreover, it does not require much
creativity to see how the Government might punish
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contractors—with, e.g., negative past performance ratings or potentially suspensions or debarment—when
those firms’ employees brought (either substantiated
or unsubstantiated) discrimination allegations against
Government officials.
Perhaps most importantly, both the Government
and its contractors need to understand that, as federal agencies continue to rely on contractors for their
staffing needs, the ability to distinguish between civil
servants and contractors—in the eyes of the law—
will become increasingly more difficult. We know the
blended workforce is here to stay. We don’t yet know
what that really means.
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